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Cars have for a long time been a symbol for the freedom and autonomy of their users.
Now autonomous driving raises the question how the data flows related to autonomous
driving influence the privacy of these cars’ users. Therefore this chapter discusses ﬁve
guiding questions on autonomous driving, data flows, and the privacy impact of
vehicles interacting with other entities: (1) Which “new” or additional data are being
collected and processed due to autonomous driving and which consequences result
from those “new” or additional data being collected and processed? (Sect. 24.2);
(2) Are certain types of data special and do they cause special hindrances? (Sect. 24.3);
(3) What is required from the perspective of privacy? (Sect. 24.4); (4) When building
architectures, what needs to be kept in mind to avoid creating difﬁcult or even
unsolvable privacy problems? (Sect. 24.5); (5) What needs to be considered in the long
term? (Sect. 24.6). The questions will be discussed relating as much as possible to the
case studies that were introduced at the beginning of this book. Sect. 24.7 concludes
this text including an analysis whether more autonomy of driving vehicles leads to
more privacy problems.
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24.1 Introduction: Cars, Freedom, and Privacy
Cars have for a long time been a symbol for the freedom and autonomy of their users, be it
drivers or passengers: Car drivers can decide on their own, where to drive, which route to
choose and often even how fast to travel (or at least when to take a break), and they don’t
need to report this to anybody. Many pieces of art reflect the opportunity for freedom and
escape from (often undue) control that cars offer to their users. Some of the most
impressive examples may be episodes 3, 4, 6, and 7 of the 1947 movie “In those days” [1],
which describe the more or less successful car journeys of several people oppressed by the
German Nazi regime between 1933 and 1945; other examples can be mentioned also
(Chap. 3). At the same time, a car offers its driver and holder a protected sphere of
privacy: People from outside usually don’t hear what is communicated in a car and they
cannot easily take a seat and join the conversation. “My car is my castle” is not as popular
as “my home is my castle”; still many people see their car as the extension of their home;
correspondingly many household goods and activities can be viewed in a car ([2], para-
graph 2).
If one takes this perspective, autonomous cars could be just an extension of the tra-
ditional concepts of freedom, autonomy, and privacy for their drivers and users. However,
“autonomous driving” in ﬁrst instance makes the driving more autonomous from the
drivers. At the same time, it relies much more on interaction with the outside world than a
human-driven car. Autonomous cars sense their environment and often even communicate
with that environment, e.g. cars nearby. Beyond that exchange with near-by entities, there
are plans to control and synchronize cars with trafﬁc centers to optimize their behavior,
e.g. their choice of a route. Like any other centralized entity collecting data, this raises
privacy concerns, and motivates an analysis of the data flows and the corresponding
privacy impact. The situation is more critical if one considers that cars not only can collect
a lot of data on their users and the environment, but also store them for a long time and
then communicate them to other entities.
Therefore this chapter follows ﬁve guiding questions on autonomous driving, data
flows, and the privacy impact of vehicles interacting with other entities:
1. Which “new” or additional data are being collected and processed due to autonomous
driving, and which consequences result from those “new” or additional data being
collected and processed? (Sect. 24.2)
2. Are certain types of data special and do they cause special hindrances? (Sect. 24.3)
3. What is required from the perspective of privacy? (Sect. 24.4)
4. When building architectures, what needs to be kept in mind to avoid creating difﬁcult
or even unsolvable privacy problems? (Sect. 24.5)
5. What needs to be considered in the long term? (Sect. 24.6).
The questions will be discussed relating as much as possible to the use cases that were
introduced at the beginning of this book. Section 24.7 concludes this chapter.
498 K. Rannenberg
24.2 Additional Data Collected and Processed due
to Autonomous Driving
To assess the opportunities and risks associated with collecting additional data and
making it usable, it is useful to ﬁrst try to identify those data. This will be done along the
four use cases deﬁned in Chap. 2, but ﬁrst a short overview on data that is being collected
or may be collected in a non-autonomous car will be given.
24.2.1 Personal Data Collected and Potentially Transmitted
in Today’s Networked Cars
While the analysis in this chapter will concentrate on “new” or additional data, it should
be mentioned here, that quite a few sensitive personal data are already collected in today’s
cars and sometimes even transmitted. Some examples are
• All types of location data and navigational data: Typical data are destination, travel
time, travel habits (“every weekend to Stuttgart”) and preferences for routing (scenic
vs. fast vs. ecologically friendly vs. on the edge of legality). Especially when a car is
tracked by a dispatching system, a theft control system, a car insurance system, or a
road pricing system, a lot of information is collected about its whereabouts and in
many cases transferred to the related central entities. Some of these systems store data
in decentralized fashion due to their sensitivity, but others don’t. An example that
became quite prominent recently is the new European eCall system [3–5]: eCall is
activated automatically as soon as in-vehicle sensors detect a serious crash. Once set
off, the system dials the European emergency number 112, establishes a telephone link
to an emergency call center and sends details of the accident to the rescue services,
including the time of incident, the accurate position of the crashed vehicle and the
direction of travel (most important on motorways and in tunnels). An eCall can also be
triggered manually by pushing a button in the car, for example by a witness to a
serious accident.
• Data on driving dynamics: This type of data, for instance on acceleration, gives
information on the behavior of the car but also on the behavior of the driver, such as
the driving style (e.g. calm vs. aggressive vs. fast vs. on the edge of legality).
• Data on driving behavior: These data can be derived from location data over time. For
example, comparing the location of a car on a highway with the location 15 min before
may tell about the average speed of the car and whether a speed limit was violated or
possibly violated.
• The environment: The car may be collecting data from the environment to document
the ride or speciﬁc trafﬁc situations in case such documentation would be considered
helpful later. Examples include dashboard cameras to document and maybe transmit
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what is happening in front of the car. Data from the environment may well be other
people’s personal data, e.g. number plates of other vehicles or faces of people.
This rough overview also raises the question: What kinds of data are actually personal?
Some of the data listed may not seem to be “personal”. However, experience over years of
initiatives aimed at privacy protection has shown that there are no guarantees that data
cannot be related to persons and cannot be misused. One consequence of this lesson is that
“personally identiﬁable information (PII)” is nowadays not only the information that
directly identiﬁes a person, but “any information that (a) can be used to identify the PII
principal to whom such information relates, or (b) is or might be directly or indirectly
linked to a PII principal” ([8], clause 2.9).1 The PII principal ([8], clause 2.11) is then the
individual whose data are being processed. In our cases, PII principals may include
drivers, passengers, or car owners, but also passersby who are sensed and can be identiﬁed
in any way.
Still, the fact remains that the practical sensitivity of data at a certain point in time
depends a lot on context, e.g. the location information of a car may be more sensitive if the
car is parked near a red-light district. More examples will be seen in the discussion of the
use cases of autonomous driving and the related interests of the parties involved. More-
over, analyzing the cases helps to illustrate new situations and the respective issues.
24.2.2 Personal Data Collected in Autonomous Cars
This section discusses the data collection in autonomous cars along the four cases as
introduced in the beginning of this book (Chap. 2).
24.2.2.1 Use Case 1: Interstate Pilot Using Driver for Extended
Availability
The driving robot takes over the driving task, but only on interstates or interstate-like
expressways. During autonomous journeys, drivers become passengers who can take their
hands off the steering wheel and feet off the pedals and pursue other activities. The driving
robot coordinates a safe handover to the driver and may even stop the car at a safe place if
needed.
1The relation between data and information is too subtle and too complex to be sufﬁciently
explained within the limits of this chapter. All the same, considering data and information as roughly
equivalent should sufﬁce for the purpose of this chapter. Using only one term would put the paper at
odds with some of the referenced literature.
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The new and additional data the car can collect and learn in this case are data on:
• Driver capabilities, e.g. whether the driver is able to take back control from the robot
or not, and how much time such a take-back-operation takes: Both types of data may
be of interest as up-to-date data for immediate reaction but also as a basis for longi-
tudinal evaluations.
• Driving behavior: On top of other data on driving behavior that are already available
nowadays, this case enables the collection of additional data, i.e. under which cir-
cumstances the driver delegates control and/or demands it back.
• The environment: Additional data from the environment can be collected to pursue the
autonomous ride. Also, documenting the ride or speciﬁc trafﬁc situations may be
considered helpful to handle potential conflicts. As in Sect. 24.2.1, data from the
environment may well be the personal data of other people, e.g. number plates of
vehicles or people’s faces. So environmental data contain a mix of personal data of
several people, which makes them especially delicate.
Following the discussion on the legal and liability implications of autonomous driving
(see the part of this book on law and liability (Part V) one can indeed assume that there
will be an interest in collecting data to document potential accidents and investigate what
behavior of the car, the robot, the driver, or other parties may have caused the accidents.
This would accord with other cases of law enforcement agencies having a large “appetite”
for data that may become available through the computerization of an activity, as com-
puterized activities are usually easy to log in computerized logs.
24.2.2.2 Use Case 2: Autonomous Valet Parking
The driving robot parks the vehicle at a nearby or remote location after the users have
exited and cargo has been unloaded. The driving robot drives the vehicle from the parking
location to a desired destination. The driving robot re-parks the vehicle. The driver saves
the time of ﬁnding a parking spot as well as of walking to/from a remote parking spot. In
addition, access to the vehicle is eased (spatially and temporally). Additional parking
space is used more efﬁciently and search for parking is arranged more efﬁciently.
The new and additional data the car can collect and learn in this case are data on:
• The duration of a stay: How much time do users spend at their destination?
• The area of interest: Where do the users spend more or less time?
• Times of travel and duration of gaps in between: When do users spend more or less
time leaving the car alone (e.g. always at Saturday night there is a ride to somewhere
and then a long break of more than 8 h)?
• Under which circumstances is the car left alone?
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• Visiting habits: How often does the user go where? For example, “every weekend to a
certain supermarket, bar, or discotheque.”
• The environment: These data may in principle be the same as in Use Case 1, but
depending on the environment, there may be different data. Driving through a parking
lot the car may “catch” more number plates than on a highway, but fewer people (and
faces) in the cars. However, on the way to the parking lot there may be more
pedestrians, e.g. crossing the streets, so more faces to recognize.
As there is no direct interaction between the driver and the car, no data on driving
behavior are collected.
24.2.2.3 Use Case 3: Full Automation Using Driver for Extended
Availability
Use Case 3 is similar to Use Case 1, as in both cases the driving robot performs the
driving task with drivers just being passengers who can take their hands off the steering
wheel and their feet off the pedals and pursue other activities. However, in Use Case 3 the
driver can delegate the driving task to the driving robot in many permitted areas, not just
expressways. So the new and additional data the car can collect and learn are basically the
same as in Use Case 1, but there may be more options for the driver to delegate and take
back control. This can lead to more data being available on driver behavior, especially in
circumstances where the driver delegates control and/or takes it back. Similarly to Use
Case 2, the data on the environment may be richer and more sensitive than the data
collected on a highway described in Use Case 1.
24.2.2.4 Use Case 4: Vehicle on Demand
The driving robot drives the vehicle autonomously in all scenarios with occupants and/or
cargo, but also completely without any payload. The driving robot makes the vehicle
available at any requested location. Passengers use the travel time completely indepen-
dently for activities other than performing the driving task. The cabin design is completely
free of any requirements for any driver workplace whatsoever, but it may have a camera
directed at the passenger space.
While this case is the most demanding from the perspective of autonomous driving,
there may be less additional data collected than in Use Case 3. In particular, there is no
additional data collected on driving behavior, as there is no driver in the loop anymore.
The additional data collected are:
• Travel behavior (e.g., when do passengers want to take breaks?)
• General behavior (or misbehavior) of all passengers in the car
• Data collected on the environment, e.g. to document an accident and what may have
caused it (if data on passengers are considered useful for accident documentation).
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24.2.3 Consequences for Control Over Data and Misuse Resulting
from Data Storage
In principle, the storage of any kind of data opens possibilities for any kind of processing
that would not exist without that storage. While this seems to be a theoretical triviality, the
practical consequences of storing data are that they can be used and misused later, maybe
under circumstances of which the user was not originally aware. This implies a
longer-term responsibility for these data. The responsibility has to lie with the body that
can control the data and make decisions about their usage.
If one can assume that the data stored in a car are under the sole control of the car’s
owner or driver, then determining responsibility for these data may be relatively easy.
Otherwise, the responsibility for storage and any kind of misuse would expand to the body
that controls the storage or transfer or both. This only applies, however, if the data can
leave the car and the domain of its owner without the owner being in control of this data
transfer.
There are at least two indications that powerful bodies will ask for data stored in a car
to be transmitted out of the car:
1. Law enforcement agencies very often take the approach that data stored for any
technical or commercial purpose should also be made available for law enforcement
purposes. Lawmakers have often followed this position. The example closest to cars
and location data is that of mobile phone communication. From the beginning of the
1990s, the GSM standard for cell-based mobile communication has been established
and the location information of subscribers processed in the networks. Rules were soon
established to enable law enforcement agencies to access all types of data in the GSM
networks, including location data: an example is the German Fern-
meldeüberwachungsverordnung [6], which was established as early as 1995.
2. Internet enterprises such as Google are inspired and driven by connectivity and
transmitting data. An example is a statement of Jared Cohen, Director of Google Ideas
and Eric Schmidt, Executive Chairman of Google in the conclusions of their joint book
“The New Digital Age” [7], p. 254: “Attempts to contain the spread of connectivity or
curtail people’s access will always fail over a long enough period of time–information,
like water, will always ﬁnd its way through.”
Not everything that these powerful organizations have been asking for has happened,
but the examples give an impression of the challenges accompanying data storage, even in
a contained fashion.
24.2.4 Consequences from Data Transfer to Third Parties
Data being transferred to entities outside of the domain of the car owner or driver (third
parties) can enable those entities to pursue their interests. These interests may or may not
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conform to the interests of the parties identiﬁed by the data (also called data subjects),
typically the driver or the owner of the car. This section will give examples of the
following third parties: vehicle manufacturers, insurance services, fleet operators,
government-authorized parties, peer ad-hoc networks, e.g. other trafﬁc entities or other
autonomous vehicles, and trafﬁc centers. This sequence of sections follows the rising
complexity in the setting of the third party entities.
24.2.4.1 Vehicle Manufacturers
Vehicle manufacturers may be interested in documenting vehicle behavior, e.g. to learn
about the vehicle’s behavior in extreme situations and about the quality of their (often
very complex) software, and to improve the systems. These data are similar to the kind of
data that manufacturers and operators of telecommunication systems collect for quality
assurance and maintenance purposes. At the same time, these data also deliver sensitive
information about the driver, e.g. the typical driving speed and the number of emergency
brakes or missed handovers from the driving robot in Use Cases 1 and 3.
24.2.4.2 Insurance Services
Insurance services are often interested in more information about their customers to assess
the level of risk associated with them or gain other customer insight. Depending on the
type of insurance, different information can be of interest, e.g. the insurance risk for an
accident can be derived from driving behavior (risk averse or less risk averse driving
style), and from location information for theft insurance (regions with more or less theft
risk for the speciﬁc vehicle). All cases offer rich data here, Use Cases 1 and 3 more on
driver behavior, all cases on location information, Use Case 4 also on occupants’ behavior
and emergency calls. These assessments may be fairer to insurance customers, as they
award cost-reducing behavior, but they put users under more surveillance without a clear
description of the related risks and opportunities. Often insurance services make decisions
based on scoring systems or details unknown to customers, as these details are considered
“trade secrets” the insurance companies wish kept conﬁdential to protect themselves in a
competitive market. Customers may then be surprised about decisions, e.g. the denial of
an upgraded contract or a fee raise.
24.2.4.3 Fleet Operators
Fleet operators such as rental car companies are in a situation similar to that of insurance
companies. To raise their commercial success, they try to assess the risk associated with
handing out a car to a certain customer and to consider the results of their assessments for
their pricing. Therefore the consequences for customers are also similar to those in the
case of insurances, e.g. with regard to (non)-extensions of contracts or fee rises. Also for
this scenario, all use cases offer data. A major difference to the case of insurance com-
panies is the fact that fleet operators usually own the cars, so they have more control over
the cars than an insurance company has over an insured car. This difference is important
for any concept of a “private data vault” to store sensitive data of rental customers or
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drivers (see Sect. 24.5). In the fleet-operator scenario, such a “private data vault” would
either need to be specially installed within the car to protect it from access by the fleet
operator or it would need to be brought along by the rental customer or driver.
24.2.4.4 Commercial Location-Based Services
Advertisers are interested in directing the right messages to their respective target groups.
This may include placing advertisements at the right location, e.g. special offers of shops
near the next exit, encouraging commuters in a trafﬁc jam to leave the highway and go
shopping. Also, travelers in a trafﬁc jam on the way to a major airport can be targeted with
offers from a smaller regional airport (as seen, for instance, on the highway north towards
San Francisco airport, where flights starting from San Jose have been advertised).
Advertisers are thus interested in trafﬁc flows (and jams). Moreover, they always like to
know more details about their target groups, so any kind of behavior that allows con-
clusions, e.g. on the type of traveler (business, commuting, leisure) will be welcome.
24.2.4.5 Government-Authorized Parties
Government-authorized parties such as police forces or intelligence agencies can use the
data for surveillance to detect behavior they want to sanction or prevent. In the case of the
trafﬁc police, this can be any kind of behavior deemed unsafe or in violation of trafﬁc
laws, e.g. difﬁculties or strange behavior in interaction with the driving robot. Polices
forces investigating crimes or aiming to prevent crimes as well as intelligence agencies
may be interested in analyzing navigation and movement data to learn about the social
networks of travelers, e.g. who may meet whom where. There is also the strong potential
that the interested government and intelligence agencies have their very own interpretation
of what they are authorized to do beyond the assurances and guarantees of privacy laws
and privacy protection. This may especially hold for data on the environment the car
would be collecting. Having many or all cars collecting data from the environment can be
considered a speciﬁc form of crowd-sourcing. Some municipalities are considering
crowd-sourcing to collect pollution data. This may collect fewer or no personal data from
the environment, but conceptually it is not too far from a car spying on its environment.
24.2.4.6 Peer Ad-Hoc Networks
Peer ad-hoc networks (e.g. other trafﬁc entities or other autonomous vehicles) can be
interested in any kind of data used or analyzed by a speciﬁc car to optimize path tracking
and stabilization or which results from the optimization process. This data may help the
peer ad-hoc networks to assess the road conditions other vehicles are experiencing
especially at locations that are touched by their own routes. If the data are anonymized and
stay with the involved peers, the consequences are less severe than data transfer to
(central) entities aggregating data like the other entities discussed in this chapter.
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24.2.4.7 Traffic Control Centers
Trafﬁc control centers’ interests depend a lot on the interests of their operators and owners.
Control centers aiming for efﬁcient trafﬁc flows, and to mitigate the effects of accidents on
trafﬁc flows, are interested in any kind of data that help them to assess current and future
trafﬁc situations: Driving conditions can be derived from environmental information or
from the assessments of driving behavior as delivered in all cases; potential congestion
can be derived from travel plans and navigational data. The other aims of these centers
may include collaborations with other entities to reﬁnance their costs or even deliver a
proﬁt to their owners or operators. This is helped by the fact that the other entities
discussed earlier in this section can make use of the data collected by trafﬁc centers.
The degree to which trafﬁc control centers would be interested in collaborating with
other entities interested in their data, and offer some reimbursement, may well depend on
their status and ﬁnancial situation. A private for-proﬁt control center would need to ﬁnd
funding; a public trafﬁc center may be under less pressure here. However, for many recent
major investments in public infrastructures, there were aims to operate them as
public-private partnerships to mitigate the lack of public money for investments. This
holds for toll-fee collection and was also the plan (though not a successful one) for the
Galileo satellite network. Also, public broadcasting companies are becoming more and
more dependent on private co-funding, e.g. from advertisements.
24.3 Are Certain Types of Data Special and Do They Create
Particular Obstacles?
It is extremely difﬁcult to predict the potential use of data for legitimate or illegitimate
purposes, and it has proven impossible to guarantee that no kind of data would be used or
misused, even in the long run. One reason is that, with today’s connectivity, combining
data is easy. Data on the agility a driver shows when taking back control from a driving
robot may look harmless, but if put in relation to the same data 10 years before or hence,
they can give the impression of driving abilities tending to rise or fall. This may put the
driver at an unfair disadvantage, e.g. when insurance fees are calculated. Similar scoring
activities by credit rating agencies have shown to be often very wrong with regard to an
individual, even if they may have a statistical value. Therefore there are no explicit rules to
consider certain data special and have special hindrances for their usage. One can get the
feeling that data allowing conclusions on to be drawn people’s health and/or (political)
views are especially sensitive, but there are no clear indications that these are always more
sensitive than data on their ﬁnancial situation, for example.
The legal consequence of this difﬁculty is the principle of asking for the processing of
each and every piece of data to be authorized, instead of giving general clearances (see
also the descriptions of “Purpose legitimacy and speciﬁcation” and “Collection limitation”
in Sect. 24.4.1). All data thus needs to be checked: Are they absolutely necessary to
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provide the service for which they have been collected? Was that type of processing
appropriate?
24.4 Requirements from the Perspective of Privacy
This section discusses the requirements from a privacy perspective, starting with an
introduction of internationally established principles and their relation to the use cases
(Sect. 24.4.1). Then additional surveillance measures for a “data-protected” usage of the
additional data are discussed in Sect. 24.4.2, before Sect. 24.4.3 focuses on limiting access
rights and on encryption.
24.4.1 Principles
For any personal data collected and transmitted beyond the domain of the data subject,
there must be a clear justiﬁcation with regard to relevant privacy principles and related
requirements. Privacy principles and requirements depend on the respective national,
regional and sometimes sector-speciﬁc legislation, so a complete analysis would be
impossible. Fortunately there is now the international standard ISO/IEC 29100 Privacy
Framework that was completed in 2011 and lists eleven privacy principles [8]. These
privacy principles were derived from existing principles developed by states, countries
and international organizations, e.g. the OECD and the EU. The editors came from
Germany and the USA, and experts from many countries participated intensively in the
development. One focus of the ISO/IEC 29100 Privacy Framework is the implementation
of the privacy principles in ICT (Information and Communications Technology) systems;
another is on developing privacy management systems within organizations’ ICT systems.
The privacy principles aim at guiding the design, development, and implementation of
privacy policies and privacy controls. A sketch of related requirements can also be found
in a recent recommendation of the very influential “Deutscher Verkehrsgerichtstag,” an
annual conference of legal experts focused on trafﬁc regulation [9]. The eleven principles
are:
1. Consent and choice
2. Purpose legitimacy and speciﬁcation
3. Collection limitation
4. Data minimization
5. Use, retention and disclosure limitation
6. Accuracy and quality
7. Openness, transparency and notice
8. Individual participation and access




This section will concentrate on explaining the principles considered most important
and give some examples from the use cases2:
• Consent and choice: The Consent principle was introduced over time to ensure that PII
(personally identiﬁable information) principals can control whether or not their PII is
being processed except where applicable law speciﬁcally allows the processing of PII
without consent. It is explicitly mentioned that consent needs to be informed consent,
so PII principals are to be informed about what they agree to, and it also needs to be
opt-in consent. It turned out that demanding appropriate choice became important to
avoid users giving de facto consent, as they have no alternative to get the respective
service. In Use Cases 1, 2 and 3, consent will be needed from the owner, the driver and
any identiﬁed passenger. In Use Case 4, passengers’ and, if applicable, drivers’ con-
sent is required. The most critical question, however, arises around consent for
scanned environmental data. For example, private observation cameras are usually not
allowed when they cover public space and can collect data from people there. For data
from public observation cameras there are strict rulings that follow the following
principles.
• Purpose legitimacy and speciﬁcation: Adhering to this principle means: ensuring that
any purposes comply with applicable law and rely on a permissible legal basis;
communicating any purpose to the PII principal before the information is collected or
used for a new purpose; using language for this speciﬁcation which is clear and
appropriately adapted to the circumstances; and, if applicable, giving sufﬁcient
explanations for the need to process sensitive PII. A purpose can require a legal basis
or a speciﬁc authorization by a data protection authority or a government authority. If
the purposes for processing PII do not conform to applicable law, processing should
not take place. For all use cases this means especially that the purposes need to be
speciﬁed explicitly and in a clear way. This will be a special challenge for the scanning
of environmental data.
• Collection limitation: The collection of PII is to be limited within the bounds of
applicable law and those data that are strictly necessary for the speciﬁed purpose(s). In
our use cases, this applies especially to any data on the behavior of any driver and
identiﬁed passenger. If the purpose is autonomous driving, any data collection will
need to be justiﬁed in relation to autonomous driving (and not any other use, even if,
for example, it seems commercially attractive).
• Data minimization: Data minimization is closely linked to collection limitation, but
refers to strictly minimizing the processing of PII. Data processing procedures and ICT
systems are to minimize the PII processed and access to it. Default options should,
2ISO/IEC 29100 has more extensive explanations of the principles.
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wherever possible, not involve the identiﬁcation of PII principals, reduce the
observability of their behavior, and limit the linkability of the PII collected with other
PII (and thereby also the traceability of the PII principal). Moreover, one should delete
and dispose of PII whenever the purpose for PII processing has expired, there are no
legal requirements to keep the PII, or whenever it is practical to do so. For all four use
cases, this principle limits the transfer of any data to any central entities, such as trafﬁc
control centers: PII that is only needed to manage the situation in and around the
vehicle shall not leave the vehicle without the PII principal’s permission. Data mini-
mization also demands the storage of sensed data to be limited, especially when the
data can easily be recollected when needed again. Last but not least, limiting the
linkability of the PII collected calls for anonymization and aggregation of any data that
is not needed for individual cases.
• Information security: Information security refers to protecting PII with appropriate
controls at operational, functional and strategic levels to ensure the integrity, conﬁ-
dentiality and availability of the PII, and protect it against risks such as unauthorized
access, destruction, use, modiﬁcation, disclosure or loss throughout the whole of its
life cycle. Information security spans a wide spectrum from choosing an appropriate
PII processor to limiting access to PII to those individuals who require such access to
perform their duties. Sects. 24.4.2 and 24.4.3 describe related measures.
Data usage beyond that absolutely needed to provide the service for which the data was
collected requires explicit consent. So for any PII collected and transferred beyond the
domain of the PII principal, there must be a clear and convincing rationale with regard to
relevant privacy principles. The rationale must be convincing for the PII principal in terms
of what is gained and what is given up. The rationale must also be convincing for the
regulator, who will check whether the PII principal is being misled, e.g. by stating a data
processing necessity that does not exist when, following the data minimization principle,
an alternative methodology or technology could be chosen. The regulator will also check,
whether fundamental rights would be endangered by processing the data; fundamental
rights cannot simply be given up by users through consent, as they may not understand the
consequences. A related example would be asking users to store and process their voting
behavior.
Any PII that may enable users to be discriminated against according to their beliefs,
thoughts or actions (e.g. topics of interest and related locations and destinations (e.g.
towards a political demonstration), also in relation to other people’s locations and desti-
nations of) is in many practical cases especially critical.
One example for a reasoning can be found in the landmark decision of the German
Constitutional Court from 1983 [10], that established the fundamental right of “Infor-
mational Self-Determination” in Germany and asks to beware of a “chilling effect” on
citizens’ participation in democratic processes: A person who is uncertain as to whether
unusual behavior is being taken note of, used, or transferred to others will attempt to avoid
standing out through such behavior. Persons who assume, for example, that attendance of
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an assembly or participation in a citizens’ interest group will be ofﬁcially recorded, and
that this could expose them to risks, will possibly waive the exercising of their corre-
sponding fundamental rights. This would not only restrict the possibilities for personal
development of those individuals but also be detrimental to the public good, as
self-determination is an elementary prerequisite for the functioning of a free democratic
society based on the freedom of action and participation of its citizens.
Similar considerations are especially relevant in countries with unstable political
governance, where citizens have to fear that a future government may not tolerate
behavior that would currently be perfectly legal. This may include travelling to a political
meeting.
Moreover, the Snowden revelations [11] have shown that there are severe weaknesses
to be considered in the data security governance of many entities storing PII, especially
data attractive to intelligence agencies. These developments can be expected to be
included in future risk analyses and considerations.
24.4.2 Additional Surveillance Measures for “Data-Protected”
Usage of Additional Data
Additional surveillance measures for a “data-protected” usage of the additional data can
be foreseen. They are motivated, for example, by the ISO/IEC 29100 principle of
accountability [8].
The accountability principle means that the processing of PII entails a duty of care and
the adoption of concrete and practical measures for its protection. This will apply to any
party processing PII. The measures are supposed to not only secure the proper processing,
but also enable and ease supervision by regulatory authorities, e.g. data protection
commissioners.
The information security principle (cf. also Sect. 24.4.1) calls, for example, for controls
at operational, functional and strategic levels to ensure the integrity, conﬁdentiality and
availability of the PII, and protect it against risks such as unauthorized access, destruction,
use, modiﬁcation, disclosure or loss throughout the whole of its life cycle.
Typical issues of importance are to audit who had or has access to the PII and who
worked or works with it in which way. Additional surveillance measures will therefore
apply to any additional entity that may have access to the PII. Experience with auditing
has shown that it can lead to additional privacy problems, as audit records on processing
may be used in an even more discriminatory way than the data themselves. An example
could be an entry in a trafﬁc control center’s audit log that PII on the reaction times of a
certain driver’s interaction with the driving robot were examined by a task force to
analyze driving behavior.
Moreover, additional surveillance measures should not lead to oversurveillance of the
individuals working with the system, at least in regions where privacy in the workplace is
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protected. So a ﬁne balance has to be found depending on the relation between customer
protection and employee protection.
24.4.3 Limiting Access Rights and Encryption
Limiting access rights and encryption are typical instruments of information security.
Limiting access rights is also mentioned under the “Information Security” principle of
ISO/IEC 29100. It follows the concept of “need-to-know”, limiting access to PII to those
individuals who require such access to perform their duties, and limiting the access of
those individuals to only that PII which they require to perform their duties. Access rights
can be deﬁned by deﬁning exactly which entity can access which PII. This asks for a
ﬁne-grained speciﬁcation of the system, and can best be achieved if privacy is already
considered during the design phase, e.g. when designing which data are collected by the
vehicle and for which application they are needed.
Another way to limit access rights is to deﬁne that only groups of entities can jointly
access certain data, e.g. any kind of audit records. This four-eye principle (or n-eye
principle) helps against unauthorized use of data and can especially apply to audit records
of system behavior involving PII. One could specify, for example, that these kinds of data
are only made available to address a deﬁned system failure, and that both the PII principal
and the interested party, e.g. an authorized repair shop, need to agree on the access. The
n-eye principle can also be implemented by encryption if parts of keys are distributed
among the respective stakeholders.
Encryption is not directly mentioned in ISO/IEC 29100 as its use is sometimes con-
sidered controversial in some ISO/IEC member states. However, encryption is mentioned
as an example of a requirement for transmitting medical PII over a public network ([8],
Clause 4.4.7). It is also being asked for more and more by Privacy Commissioners, who
have understood its advantages, especially for creating virtual vaults or tunnels to protect
PII even without the cooperation of the entity storing or transporting the PII. If encryption
is used, it is important to deﬁne clearly who will be allowed to hold the keys for the
respective encryption and decryption. PII providing clues to an individual’s behavior and
abilities may need to be protected by an asymmetric encryption system, and then by
encrypting the PII with the public key of the respective individual. This would ensure that
the PII can only be decrypted with the corresponding private key of the individual.
24.5 Architectural Considerations
Any architectural considerations need to consider the interests of systems’ stakeholders.
PII stakeholders mentioned in this text so far include drivers, passengers and owners of
cars. Other stakeholders may be individuals who need to work with the PII, perhaps also
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bystanders on the street or other trafﬁc participants if they can be identiﬁed by the system.3
It turns out to be useful to consider non-professional users of systems especially, as they
usually have less opportunity to protect themselves [12]. They are usually also those
entities that Privacy Commissioners are meant to look after.
In general, architecture characteristics can be derived from the principles discussed in
Sect. 24.4.1. The principles of collection limitation, data minimization, and information
security are especially relevant for architectural considerations. Any architecture that
allows a service to be provided that collects, uses and spreads less PII not only reduces the
damaging consequences of any misuse, but also eases the securing of information.
Three architecture characteristics and elements are especially recommendable:
1. Decentralized approaches: If PII is not transferred to central entities, such as trafﬁc
centers, the risk of misuse is reduced. Examples include:
– If, in any of the cases, a situation can be resolved directly between two vehicles,
this is better than involving a trafﬁc control center or other external entity.
Sometimes the issue of the trustworthiness of the information provided by other
vehicles is brought up. A quick solution seems to be to identify the other vehicle
individually and to check it against a central registration database, similarly to a
police car checking registration plates of cars. This may be a nice sales scenario for
selling directory services, but viewing it as a gain for privacy or security is
short-sighted. It would transfer an exceptional police activity into a regular activity
performed by perhaps every vehicle, and so establish a massive surveillance
infrastructure. Moreover, being able to identify a car precisely does not give any
guarantee for the information provided by that vehicle. This information may still
be manipulated and misleading even if a valid identiﬁer is sent by the vehicle
originating the information.
– The concept of a user-owned “Private Data Vault” (PDV) to store PII should be
explored in more detail to enable the storage of sensitive data under the user’s
control. This PDV could store the PII of the respective individuals and protect it
against unwanted access, so that access is not possible without those individuals’
consent. Especially for drivers using cars used by several drivers, and for rental
customers or drivers, this would be useful. A PDV could be installed within the
vehicle (in the special case of vehicles used mainly by a single person) or would
ideally be brought by the respective driver when using the car. The PDV should use
appropriate hardware protection for storing the data, and can be the initialization of
trustworthy data stores. A combination with other personal devices such as mobile
phones might be possible in future, but ﬁrst these devices need to become more
secure and better able to protect themselves, especially against outside approaches
3This may be a motivation to design the system in such a way that it does not identify bystanders on
the street or other trafﬁc participants.
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to read their data. Related concepts exist for road toll charging, see e.g. [13], and
pay-as-you drive insurance, see e.g. [14].
– If data needs to be stored that is not only personal data of the car user, but also of
other parties, such as environmental data (it may identify other people, but also the
route the user used), the four-or-n-eye principle should be applied for access
control.
– In Use Case 2, trafﬁc control centers or other entities involved in the choice of
parking spaces should not ask the drivers or passengers for all kinds of priorities for
a parking space or route, but instead give some options, so that the user or, a local
system assisting the user, can choose. This reduces the risk of a centralized pro-
cessing of users’ attitudes with regards to prices and locational preferences.
2. Anonymization: Information that needs to be collected for a justiﬁed purpose does not
necessarily need to be collected in a way that identiﬁes the respective individual. Even
information that is collected in a way that identiﬁes individuals may not need to be
processed further in such a way. This holds especially for any information that is only
needed in an aggregated form:
– Trafﬁc and congestion analysis does not need to identify individual cars or even
drivers.
– Interaction with peers, e.g. exchanging data for trafﬁc safety with other vehicles,
does not require identiﬁcation (see the discussion above under “Decentralized
approaches”).
– Not even access control for cars (e.g. to decide access to parking spaces) needs to
identify cars individually. The concepts of Partial Identities (ISO/IEC 24760-1,
[15]) and Privacy-friendly Attribute Based Credentials [16] allow the limiting of
information presented in such cases to what is really needed to gain access. For
example, in Use Case 2 the certiﬁed information that a parking space was booked
for the autonomous valet-parking of a vehicle does not need to identify the indi-
vidual vehicle towards the access control system of the parking space. Transferring
a presentation token that only identiﬁes the vehicle if it is used twice (and is
therefore misused) should sufﬁce.
3. Systematic deletion of PII: Data deletion is often neglected in concepts and life-cycle
models for ICT systems. Especially in the case of PII, this can lead to dangerous
misuse and consequential liabilities. Therefore, draft architectures in any of the cases
should already be including concepts for systematic data deletion; this requires careful
consideration as to how long which data need to be kept for which purpose. Within the
German Standardization Organization DIN, and also at ISO/IEC, standardization ini-
tiatives for data deletion have been started, see e.g. [17]. These initiatives build to a
major degree on the data deletion concept of the German Toll Collect road pricing
scheme for trucks.
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24.6 Long-term Considerations
It seems likely that any infrastructures for autonomous driving will be large, and therefore
that any planning for their introduction, use, and maintenance needs to be long-term.
A few remarks about long-term experiences should, then, be useful:
1. Application creep: Once a technical infrastructure is established for some applications,
new additional applications “piggy-backing” on the same technology and infrastruc-
ture but with more privacy risks can be easy to implement. This has been experienced,
for instance for the GSM mobile communication network, which has a lot of powerful
functionality; or for localization, whose de-facto-introduction and exploitation in some
countries has been a grey area. Related fears exist for road tolling systems and their
surveillance infrastructures established for trucks or other commercial vehicles only.
The extension to private cars may be easy.
2. Creep from test systems to real systems: Experience in Internet software development
shows that the step from a test system, or even an experimental prototype with reduced
or no security or privacy protection, to a real production system may be as easy as
changing the web link on a public portal to point to a new backend system. Such a
change may lead to test systems being rushed into real production, while these systems
may not be protected like real systems. Particularly projects that are short of resources
and need quick success can be tempted by this strategy.
3. Mandatory pseudo-unique identiﬁcation: More and more computer devices store and
issue identiﬁers that identify these devices more or less uniquely and reliably. One
example is the GSM International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI). In
theory, the IMEI is a unique identiﬁer for every GSM mobile communication device;
in practice, it can be manipulated. A similar situation exists for the Media Access
Control address (MAC address) in Internet networks, which theoretically is a unique
identiﬁer assigned to network interfaces. Both identiﬁers also relate to cars equipped
with the respective communication technology. While the security of these systems is
low, they make (unofﬁcial) data collections very easy and hence create major privacy
problems. Moreover, they foster a recurring “appetite” in interested parties for more
identiﬁcation of users in communication networks or Internet services. This trend
needs to be recognized, considered, and overcome [18].
24.7 Concluding Considerations
One may think that a higher degree of autonomy in driving would lead to more data
processing to enable the autonomous driving, and consequently to more surveillance.
Actually, this is not necessarily the case. The two main factors leading to the collection
and spreading of additional data through autonomous driving are:
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1. The interaction between the vehicle and the driver(s), passenger(s) and possibly owner
(s) becomes more intensive, which leads to the storage and processing of additional
data.
2. The interaction of the vehicle with other entities, especially with any kind of trafﬁc
control center becomes more intensive, which leads to additional transfer of potentially
sensitive data out of the vehicle.
An autonomously driving vehicle that drives sufﬁciently autonomously, that it does not
need to interact with a driver, does not need to collect more data from a driver than any
“conventional” car. Also, if the vehicle is able to autonomously navigate through trafﬁc
and reach its destination, it would not communicate more data than any other vehicle, and
even less data, than a conventional car using a centralized navigation system and that is
under surveillance, e.g. by a system that constantly collects the geo-coordinates of the car.
Of course, some of the close-to reality intermediate scenarios, e.g. a vehicle handing
over to a driver in critical situations (see e.g. Use Case 1) combined with a centralized
surveillance in critical situation can lead to more surveillance and consequently more
privacy problems. So while, in theory, vehicles driving more autonomously does not
necessarily lead to more privacy problems, there is a realistic threat that in practice this
will happen if the design and architecture do not carefully avoid privacy problems.
Therefore, an approach of privacy-by-design for autonomous driving-scenarios is
needed. At least for the following questions, one needs to perform a thorough check:
– Is the collection, processing, or transmission of data really needed for a real
improvement in the driving situation?
– Is this advantage worth the additional privacy risks?
– In potential dilemmas between more functionality and more safety on the one hand,
and less privacy on the other, can the PII stakeholders (often drivers, passengers,
owners) be enabled to decide for themselves and in an informed manner?
– Do the data stay under the control of the PII stakeholders, or do they leave their
domain of control?
There is clearly a challenge to protect the freedom that has been associated with
personal cars for a long time, and that is one of the reasons for their success. Perhaps a
unique selling point for the established car industry, and especially premium manufac-
turers and brands, is to not simply follow the easy trend of Internet businesses in letting
information flow everywhere unless they get stopped by legislation or customer outrage,
but rather to facilitate proper protection for their customers. The car industry has shown in
other areas, for instance in the reduction of energy consumption, that one does not need to
accept primitive solutions, but can overcome adverse effects and reduce resource usage by
careful planning and engineering. The triggers for this approach will come anyway.
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